

VZCZCXYZ0001  
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHLGB #1024/01 3111339  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
P 071339Z NOV 07  
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4887  
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 001024

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2017

TAGS: PREL PINR PHUM MOPS RW  
SUBJECT: SENIOR ADVISOR SHORTLEY CALLS ON NATIONAL SECURITY  
ADVISOR NDAHIRO

REF: A. KIGALI 1019

1B. KIGALI 1022

Classified By: Ambassador Michael R. Arietti, reason 1.4 (B/D)

11. (C) Summary. Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution Timothy Shortley and Ambassador called on National Security Advisor Emmanuel Ndahiro on October 6 to discuss enhanced US engagement on addressing negative forces in eastern DRC and ending the stand-off with Nkunda. Ndahiro pledged Rwandan support for the USG effort to de-escalate the situation with Nkunda and to begin concrete actions against the FDLR. He agreed to assemble extensive Rwandan intelligence on the locations and identities of senior FDLR personnel in the Kivus. He denied that Rwanda supported Nkunda, although he did admit regular contact by his personnel with Nkunda forces to "feel the pulse" of the security situation. He expressed concern for the attitude of France toward the FDLR. End summary.

12. (C) Shortley began the meeting with Ndahiro by saying the USG would be more engaged in the eastern Congo, and was determined to see the FDLR disarmed and disbanded. As he did previously (refs), Shortley stated the U.S. would place officers in Goma, would act as an observer for the Joint Verification Mechanism (JVM), and would convene a December Heads of State Tripartite-Plus Summit in Addis Ababa, called by the Secretary to fashion a joint plan of action against negative forces in the Kivus. Continuing, Shortley noted President Kabila had accepted the concept of simultaneous action against renegade general Nkunda and the FDLR, and the U.S. was looking for Rwandan help in convincing Nkunda to send troops to brassage. This would defuse tensions in the Kivus, assist Kabila politically, and allow for robust action to begin against the FDLR. Finally, Shortley asked Ndahiro whether the GOR could issue a strong statement on Nkunda, calling on him to do so.

13. (C) Ndahiro replied (half-in-jest): "better late than never." The Government of Rwanda (GOR) welcomed the U.S. initiative, he said, and hoped to see a changed dynamic in the Kivus. The GOR had many times made plain its lack of support for Nkunda. "We do not control him, said Ndahiro, we "have no brief" for criminals in his forces who commit abuses, we do not see him as a "plus" for the GOR." But, he said, "we do "take the pulse" of his forces." In regard to getting Nkunda's men to brassage, Ndahiro stated the GOR needed to be careful about being seen as negotiating with the renegade general. He added the DRC knows Rwanda does not support him, and the GOR did not wish to give the DRC a pretext for saying the GOR did in fact support Nkunda. Continuing, Ndahiro asserted that Nkunda himself was not the issue but rather the ethnic Tutsi community he represented and its grievances. If he disappeared from the scene, some guarantees must be in place to protect what would likely be a vulnerable population of Congolese Tutsis.

¶4. (C) Ndahiro said what the GOR wanted to see included in any package of proposals dealing with the FDLR was a strong UN Security Council resolution sanctioning FDLR leadership and mandating disarmament of the FDLR as an organization. Shortley replied that a joint statement by the GOR and the DRC calling upon the Security Council to do so would be of great benefit. If the two governments could do so at the upcoming Conference of the Great Lakes discussions in Nairobi, this would be one more sign, he said, of a new era of cooperation between the two governments in dealing with negative forces, and a new dynamic in the Kivus.

¶5. (C) When Shortley asked if Rwanda could provide intelligence on the FDLR, Ndahiro replied that the GOR had extensive information on the FDLR leadership, its command locations, its business interests, its ties to local communities and local officials. The GOR would be happy to share it, he said, and he would be willing to bring the package himself during an upcoming trip to the U.S. It would also document DRC government collusion with the FDLR, he commented. For that reason, he said, the DRC did not want to see the JVM start operations -- as the JVM teams would soon find evidence of collusion. Shortley replied that he had told President Kabila and his officials that there was evidence of collusion, and it could not continue. In reply the DRC charged Rwanda with supporting Nkunda, and claimed to have six hours of tapes showing communications between Nkunda and Rwandan forces. "I do not meet speak with him myself," said Ndahiro, but "I expect my people to be in contact with his men. We have to know what is going on over there." According to Ndahiro, this type of contact did not constitute support.

¶6. (C) As an aside, Ndahiro expressed concern that the French government might not want the FDLR to "go away." Of particular concern were reports that France was in contact with Ex-FAR officers who had been outside of Rwanda during the genocide, and so could be promoted as "clean" alternatives to the current FDLR leadership. Whatever the truth of these reports, he said, French policy on Rwanda was confused, owing in part to President Sarkozy's "unwillingness" to respond to requests for direction from the French Foreign Ministry. Ndahiro claimed that Foreign Minister Kouchner had complained of this failure to give direction, and allegedly had been told by Sarkozy that he was going too fast. Rwanda had a favorable image of Kouchner, said Ndahiro, who was sensitive to Rwandan realities, but the GOR realized that the French government would likely never apologize for its actions during the 1994 genocide. He reflected, however, that France must "deal with the issue of its role in 1994."

¶7. (C) Shortley concluded the discussion by emphasizing the importance of a "quick start" to brassage to lower tensions, shore up Kabila's political support, and begin the process of focusing on the FDLR. Ndahiro reiterated Rwandan support for the Tripartite-Plus Summit in Addis Ababa, and for the USG's enhanced engagement in the Kivus.

¶8. (C) Comment. Ndahiro's focus on intelligence, "feeling the pulse" of Nkunda's forces, but claiming to be hesitant to "negotiate" with him (and disavowing any support), may strike some as too fine a distinction, but we have found him to be a credible and reasonable voice on Rwandan affairs and regional security issues. His strong support for the USG initiative in eastern Congo is welcome, as he is an important player within the Rwandan government. His comments match those of other Rwandan officials recently consulted during the Shortley visit -- the GOR is demonstrating its traditional message discipline, particularly on key matters of state. His visit to the U.S provides an important opportunity to exchange views. End Comment.